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Abstract
This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties
in a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are unin-
formed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage, but can
decide to resolve the information imperfection at non-negative cost at the punishment
stage. We examine how monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring
costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about commonalities and differences
between second and third party behavior. We establish three effects of positive monitoring
costs relative to the zero-cost baseline and find that each one affects third parties differ-
ently than second parties: A «direct punishment cost effect» (the supply of non-strategic
punishment decreases), a «blind punishment effect» (players punish without resolving the
information imperfection) and a «diffusion effect» (defectors make up a smaller share of
the punished and receive weaker punishment). The first effect affects third parties less,
the other two more. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly weaker in-
centives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In
addition, the differences between second and third parties suggest the presence of a «pure
role effect»: Taking into account elicited beliefs and risk preferences, third parties punish
differently from second parties, not just more weakly. (JEL C92, C72, D03, D80, Z13)
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1 Introduction
Social norms, normative standards of behavior that are enforced by informal social sanc-
tions, exist in every human society, and economists increasingly recognize their importance
in accounting for cooperative behavior in a broad range of economic contexts such as team
production, trade, credit or resource management. A recent stream of experimental research
has produced valuable insights into how they are enforced by non-materially motivated so-
cial sanctions (see Balliet et al., 2011, for an overview). In this, observability of behavior has
emerged as a critical condition for social sanctions. As Elster (2009) argues, the application
of social rewards and punishments is difficult if there is uncertainty about the target behav-
ior.1 However, whether and to what extent a potential sanctioner is in the position to observe,
or otherwise acquire information about the target individual’s behavior, is rarely fixed exoge-
nously. In many situations, information on the target individual’s actions is not immutably
imperfect, but players are in a position to augment available information through costly ef-
fort, either ex ante (e.g. putting oneself in a better «vantage point») or ex post (e.g. collecting
evidence). In other words, a player’s choice whether to impose social sanctions on another
player is frequently preceded by a choice on whether to invest resources into monitoring his
or her actions.2
In the present paper we report on an experiment that exploits this insight to inform our
understanding of how non-strategic punishment by second and third parties is affected by
information imperfections and the availability of costly remedies. Since the choice whether
to observe the behavior of the target player is costly, the setting also lends itself as an elicit-
ing device with which to learn more about the commonalities and differences between non-
strategic punishment by second parties and third parties. These commonalities and differ-
ences, and the motivational constructs that underpin them, are poorly understood despite the
argument that social sanctions by materially unaffected third parties are of particular impor-
tance to social norms in larger communities (e.g. Bendor and Mookherjee, 1990; Kandori,
1992; Bendor and Swistak, 2001). Since the vast majority of the literature focuses on sanc-
tions imposed by directly affected second parties, we know little more than that third parties
usually punish more weakly than second parties.3 To advance our understanding of whether
and how players’ behavior as second or third parties differs, we draw on a seminal experi-
mental paradigm of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) that is designed to study both non-strategic
second and third party punishment in the laboratory. The design assures that, since punish-
ment is costly and there are no conceivable pecuniary returns for sanctioning parties from
punishment, any punitive behavior must be driven by subjective benefits alone. We extend
this paradigm in a new direction by allowing important parts of the information structure of
the game to be endogenously determined by the players. Namely, while in Fehr and Fis-
chbacher (2004) sanctioning parties were automatically and freely informed about the target
player’s behavior before they had the opportunity to punish, in our experiment they decide
whether to acquire this information at non-negative cost. This gives rise to three different
1In fact, recent experimental research suggests that the efficacy of social sanctions is hampered by exogenous
restrictions on observability (Carpenter, 2007b; Bornstein and Weisel, 2010; Grechenig et al., 2010; Ambrus and
Greiner, 2012).
2Such monitoring effort to overcome imperfect information on coplayers’ actions is well known in a variety of
economically relevant contexts, such as shared resource management (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom and Gardner, 1993;
Seabright, 1993; Rustagi et al., 2010), production teams (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Kandel and Lazear, 1992;
Dong and Dow, 1993; Craig and Pencavel, 1995) and alliances (Acheson, 1975, 1987, 1988; Palmer, 1991), labor
relations (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Kanemoto and MacLeod, 1991; Lazear, 1993), micro-finance (Armendáriz and
Morduch, 2005) or neighborhood watch (Sampson et al., 1997), to name just a few.
3A noteworthy recent attempt to understand more about motivations underlying second and third party punish-
ment has been made by Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2012).
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types of behavior. If players decide not to acquire the information, their decision in the sanc-
tioning stage remains uninformed about the target player’s action at the cooperation stage of
the game. In this case, if they decide not to punish, we term their behavior «non-punishment».
If they punish despite being uninformed about the target player’s action, we term this «blind
punishment». By choosing to acquire information they are able to condition their sanction-
ing on complete information regarding the coplayer’s action, a behavior we term «targeted
punishment».
On the basis of this design, we compare second and third party sanctioning behavior
in a baseline condition with zero information costs and two conditions with different levels
of strictly positive information costs. We focus on three main questions: First, what is the
information acquisition behavior when observing coplayers’ actions is costly, and how do
second and third parties differ? Second, how does information acquisition behavior respond
to changes in the price of information, and how do second and third parties differ? Third,
how does the endogeneity of information impact on the occurrence and incidence of mutual
sanctions, and how do these patterns differ between a second and third party sanctioning
setting?
We establish three effects of positive monitoring costs relative to the zero-cost baseline
and find that each one affects third parties differently than second parties. First, information
costs have the impact of decreasing the gross supply of punishment. We call this the «direct
punishment cost effect». Second, while virtually all sanctioning is discriminate at zero infor-
mation costs, in the presence of positive information costs a distinct share of subjects punish
without resolving the information imperfection rather than refraining from sanctioning. We
term this the «blind punishment effect». The emergence of costly punishment that is delib-
erately blind when both not punishing and targeted punishment are available alternatives is a
new finding of this paper. Finally, positive information costs lead to defectors making up a
smaller share of the punished and receiving weaker punishment compared to zero informa-
tion costs, with the result that incentives get too weak to render cheating unprofitable. We
call this loss of clear focus on defectors at the punishment stage the «diffusion effect».
We also provide a comparative assessment to test whether and how players’ behavior
is influenced by the three effects depending on their role as second or third parties. If the
drivers of third party punishment are simply weaker than those of second party punishment,
then compared to second parties an increase in monitoring costs could be expected to lead
to a greater reduction in punishment supplied and less blind punishment. In our experiment,
however, we observe that the «direct punishment cost effect» affects third parties less than
second parties while the «blind punishment effect» and the «diffusion effect» are stronger
for third parties. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly weaker incentives
for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In addition,
the differences between second and third parties suggest the presence of a pure role effect:
Taking into account elicited beliefs and risk preferences, third parties punish differently from
second parties, not just more weakly.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. In section 2 we describe the aim,
design, and procedures of the experiment. We proceed to present the results in section 3. We
conclude in section 4.
2 The Experiment
The aim of the design is to generate a setting in which costly punishment behavior under
endogenous monitoring by second and third parties can be compared. The previous literature
has been careful to identify and isolate non-strategic sanctioning. In keeping with this focus,
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we design the experiment such that strategic and altruistic motives for monitoring coplayers’
actions are ruled out as far as possible and the observed monitoring and sanctioning should
be driven only by subjective rewards to the individual carrying out these activities.
We draw on the seminal study by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), who use a two-stage de-
sign consisting of a cooperation stage and a sanctioning stage. The innovative step in our
experiment consists of adding a monitoring decision into the sanctioning stage, in which
sanctioning parties decide whether to give up material rewards in order to receive full infor-
mation about the actions of their target player at the cooperation stage. If they choose not
to buy the information, they forgo the option of being able to discriminate between a coop-
erating and defecting target player at the sanctioning stage. If they do, sanctioning can be
conditioned on observed target player behavior. We exogenously vary the magnitude of this
fee as our treatment variable to observe how behavior is adjusted.
2.1 Experimental game form
Each subject played two two-stage experimental games, a second party monitoring game
(SPMG) and a third party monitoring game (TPMG) with randomly matched and unknown
coplayers in random sequence. Both games had two stages, wheres the first stage was identi-
cal in both games. In the first stage, both players in a given group of two were endowed with
10 tokens and interacted with one another in a strategic game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma type
with monetary payoffs. Subjects’ first-stage decision was binary: Players could either keep
their tokens or transfer all of them to the other group member, in which case the experimenter
tripled them.
The second stage differed between the SPMG and the TPMG. At the beginning of the
second stage, each player received an additional endowment of 40 tokens in both games.
Subsequently, in the SPMG both players in each group could choose to monitor the coplayer’s
action in the first stage and possibly punish the other. In the TPMG, the first (second) player
in a group had the opportunity to monitor and punish a player from another (a third) group.
The matching protocol was identical to the one used by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and
rules are any reciprocity between third party monitors. In order to avoid potential biases due
to a variable cost-impact ratio (see Casari, 2005), we chose a linear sanctioning technology
commonly employed in the literature (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004;
Gächter et al., 2008): any token spent by player i for punishing player j subtracted three
tokens from the latter’s payoff. Expenditures were restricted to integers and damage was
limited to sixty tokens.
In both games, subjects reported their choices in the monitoring and punishment stages
jointly using a modified version of the strategy method. Specifically, in the SPMG players
announced a contingent punishment plan, indicating the number of deduction points for each
of the target player’s possible transfer decisions, without being informed about the actual de-
cision (see Brandts and Charness, 2010, for a detailed exposition of the strategy method). The
presence of a monitoring decision was implemented in the strategy method by essentially al-
lowing subjects a choice between two punishment plans. If a subject conditioned punishment
on the target player’s action, a payment of an exogenously set monitoring fee in addition to
the applicable punishment costs fell due. The alternative was a punishment plan in which
the subject did not condition the punishment on the target player’s action. This plan did not
involve a fee over and above the cost of punishment. The advantage of this design is that
all subjects in all conditions were confronted with exactly the same task and instructions that
differed only in one number: the fee level.
Likewise, in the TPMG each third party, while being informed about the first stage trans-
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fer decision of the other member in their own group, had to indicate a punishment plan over
four possible contingencies (one for each possible transfer combination in the other group).
Again, any punishment conditioned on the target player’s first stage behavior required pay-
ment of the monitoring fee in addition to the applicable punishment costs. After the punish-
ment stage, both games ended.
2.2 Additional tasks
We supplemented the two games by incentivized elicitation of first-order beliefs and risk
preferences. Both are potentially relevant in accounting for observed behavior (Keser and
van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Since subjects
receive no actual information in the course of play, they respond to their beliefs on their
coplayer’s behavior, and this response involves a decision under strategic risk. Thus, in addi-
tion to the games described above, every subject performed the following tasks, which were
identical in each treatment and for every subject. Following their decision in the first stage,
we asked subjects to state their belief about the transfer decision of the target player and,
following their decision in the second stage, their belief about the punishment they expected
to receive. Those statements were incentivized with a opportunity to earn extra tokens in case
of accurate predictions (see appendix).
At the end of each session we employed the Holt-Laury lottery choice method (Holt
and Laury, 2002) to obtain an indication of each subject’s risk preferences (see appendix).
Subjects were only informed about this task after the two experimental games. It should be
noted that a priori it is possible that the method may not capture the specific kind of risk
involved in the situation, but since it is the most common method to elicit risk preferences we
thought it is worth investigating.
2.3 Design
Our primary focus is on the relationship between information costs and monitoring and pun-
ishment behavior. The objective of the treatments is to introduce an exogenous variation in
the cost of information acquisition with the aim of forcing a materially consequential choice
by subjects regarding the desired information status prior to the punishment decision. Specifi-
cally, we employed between-subjects variation in the monitoring fee and examine the changes
in monitoring and punishment behavior associated with this variation, both in the SPMG and
the TPMG. Evidence on monitoring and sanctioning activity when monitoring is costless, i.e.
when the fee is zero, is an obvious starting point: It provides a direct replication of the PD
experiment by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and therefore a meaningful baseline treatment.
In what follows, this treatment is labeled M0. Given the payoff structure of the game, we
expected a fee of ten tokens close to prohibitive such that we have chosen this level as a rea-
sonable boundary of the considered fee interval. In order to achieve efficient identification,
and to account for possible non-linearities, we implemented three conditions with fee levels
set at the extremes (zero and ten tokens, respectively) and the midpoint (five tokens) of the
interval and allocated approximately half of the subjects to the midpoint cell, a third to maxi-
mum cell, and a sixth to the minimum cell, respectively (see for example McClelland, 1997;
List et al., 2011, for efficient sample arrangement methods). The two treatment conditions
are labeled M5 and M10, respectively. In order to counterbalance for possible order effects,
one part of the subjects in each treatment cell played the SPMG before the TPMG, the other
part the other way around.4
4It turned out that there were no systematic differences between sequences anyway. Using Mann-Whitney tests
we find no significant differences among sequences in monitoring of second parties (p = .160) and third parties
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2.4 Subjects and procedures
All experiments were conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Alfred-Weber-Institute
(AWI-Lab) at Heidelberg University in late 2010. Participants were recruited from the gen-
eral undergraduate student population using the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner,
2004). In total 134 subjects participated, of which 49.3 percent were female. A share of 64.2
percent had never participated in a laboratory experiment before. The mean age was 21.8
years. No subject participated in more than one session and treatment. Based on the sample
arrangement described above, 22 subjects were assigned to M0, 66 to M5, and 46 to M10.
Upon entering the laboratory subjects were randomly assigned to the computer terminals.
Direct communication among them was not allowed for the duration of the entire session.
Booths separated the participants visually, ensuring that they made their decisions anony-
mously and independently. Furthermore, subjects did not receive any information on the
personal identity of any other participant, neither before nor while nor after the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, that is, before any decisions were made, subjects
received detailed written instructions that explained the exact structure of the game and the
procedural rules. The experiment was framed in a sterile way using neutral language and
avoiding value laden terms in the instructions (see supplementary material). Participants had
to answer a set of control questions individually at their respective seats in order to ensure
comprehension of the rules. We did not start the experiment before all subjects had answered
all questions correctly.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The
exact timing of events was as follows. First, the subjects were randomly matched into groups
of two. Then each subject made her or his decisions and reported expectations in the SPMG
or TPMG, depending on the sequence.5 After being informed about the payoffs, the experi-
menter announced that a second experiment will be conducted and distributed additional in-
structions that explained the differences to the first game. After being randomly re-matched
into new groups, each subject made her or his decisions and reported expectations in the
TPMG or SPMG, depending on the sequence. After being informed about the payoffs, the
experimenter announced that another (and definitely final) experiment will now be conducted
and distributed additional instructions that explained the supplementary lottery choice task.
Thus, subjects did not know until this announcement that the experiment involved another
task in order to rule out confounding effects of the lottery-choice task on the main experimen-
tal games. We cannot rule out reverse confounds which is, however, of minor significance.
After being informed about the payoffs, subjects were asked to answer a short questionnaire
while the experimenter prepared the payoffs. Subjects were then individually called to the
experimenter booth, payed out (according to a random number matched to their decisions; no
personal identities were used throughout the whole experiment) and dismissed.
In every session subjects received a fixed show-up fee of e2, which was not part of their
endowment. The whole experiment lasted approximately 90 minutes and subjects earned
an average of e18.46 (e0.10 per token earned), including the fixed show-up fee. Earnings
exceed the local average hourly wage of a typical student job and can hence be considered
meaningful to the participants.
(p = .775), second party punishment of defectors (p = .132), second party punishment of cooperators (p = .066),
third party punishment of defectors (p= .122 when the target’s coplayer defected, p= .116 when the target’s coplayer
cooperated) and of cooperators when the target’s coplayer cooperated (p= .187). Behavior was significantly different
between sequences with respect to third party punishment of cooperators when the target’s coplayer defected (p =
.006). Fisher exact tests yield similar results which are available on request.
5Until the end of the first game, subjects did not know that another game will follow. This ambiguity was a
deliberate design choice aimed at minimizing confounding effects of the second on the first game.
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Figure 1: Distribution of behavioral types at different monitoring cost levels among second parties.
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3 Results
The analysis of the experimental data will focus on three main behavioral types. One type are
«non-punishing» subjects that decide not to monitor and do not punish. These subjects are
referred to as behavioral type N. Among the punishing subjects, there are two types. «Blind
punishers» devote no resources to monitoring, but still punish indiscriminately. This type is
denoted as B. The other type T are «targeted punishers» that devote resources both to mon-
itoring and to punishment. The B-types and T -types together form the class of «punishers»,
denoted P. The forth possible type (monitoring without punishment) is excluded by design.6
We organize the presentation of the experimental results in the following way. We begin
by discussing our results from the baseline treatment that replicate previous experimental ev-
idence on sanctioning behavior. Against this benchmark, we then describe the core results
of the experiment, namely the «punishment cost effect», the «blind punishment effect», and
the «diffusion effect» resulting from costly monitoring, and the respective differences be-
tween second and third parties. Finally, we provide additional results that are informative
with respect to the underlying drivers of those differences.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the relative frequencies of behavioral types N, B, and T for the three
monitoring fee levels in the SPMG and the TPMG, respectively. Normalization is required on
account of the between-subjects design with a variable number of subjects in each treatment.
A readily apparent first diagnosis of the evidence is that variations in the cost of information
are associated with different patterns of monitoring and punishment behavior. The detailed
nature of these differences is the subject of the following sections.
6We did this in order to have control over the possible motivations underlying monitoring: in our setting moni-
toring was only possible for «instrumental» reasons in the sense of using this information in order to impose punish-
ments discriminately.
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Figure 2: Distribution of behavioral types at different monitoring cost levels among third parties.
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3.1 Punishment with costless monitoring: Replication of previous findings
The baseline treatment M0 replicates the experiment run by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)
which is among the seminal ones in a recent stream of research on costly sanctioning.7 These
experiments find that, under perfect observability, there is a marked propensity among sub-
jects to reduce others’ incomes («punish») even at a personal net cost, both as a second and
as a third party. Even after eliminating strategic motives for punishment, the share of subjects
that apply costly sanctions consistently exceeds one half. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) find
that 67 percent of second parties and 59 percent of third parties applied costly sanctions on
cheaters (unilateral defectors). Our results, displayed in the left-hand column in figure of
figures 1 and 2, respectively, are consistent with theirs.
Result 1. When information costs are zero, most second and third parties make use of the
non-strategic punishment option. The fraction of punishers is about equal among second and
third parties.
In particular, we find a large majority of 73 percent (16 out of 22) willing to impose costly
sanctions on their coplayers for non-strategic reasons, both among second and third parties.8
The class of punishers P therefore dominates when there are no monitoring costs.
Previous experiments have also generated evidence with respect to the direction of pun-
ishment under perfect observability: it (i) is predominantly supplied by cooperators and (ii)
is predominantly targeted upon cheaters. With respect to the origin of punishment, Fehr
and Fischbacher (2004) do not report the composition of the group of punishers, but the fol-
lowing numbers are indicative: 69 percent of cooperating second parties and 68 percent (36
percent) of cooperating third parties imposed sanctions on unilateral (mutual) defectors as
7See Gächter and Herrmann (2009), Balliet et al. (2011), and Bowles and Gintis (2011) for recent overviews.
8It should be noted the 16 subjects are not identical in the SPMG and TPMG, respectively. Two subjects who did
not impose sanctions as a third party did so as a second party. Likewise, two subjects who did not impose sanctions
as a second party did so as a third party. We come back to this below.
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opposed to 50 percent of defecting second parties and 40 percent (27 percent) of defecting
third parties imposing sanctions on other unilateral (mutual) defectors. The two groups of
punishers diverge even more in terms of the volume of sanctions. There, cooperating second
parties punishing unilateral (mutual) defectors spent on average 9.2 tokens and cooperating
third parties on average 3.7 tokens (1.7 tokens) on sanctions while defecting second parties
punishing unilateral (mutual) defectors spent 2.7 tokens and defecting third parties spent 1.9
tokens (0.9 tokens).
Result 2. When information costs are zero, most second and third party punishment is sup-
plied by cooperators.
In the baseline condition of the SPMG, 19 punishment actions were carried out by 14
cooperators and 2 defectors.9 Of these punishment actions, 15 (79 percent) were taken by
cooperators and 4 (21 percent) by defectors. In the baseline condition of the TPMG, 36
punishment actions were carried out of whom 28 (78 percent) were taken by cooperating
third parties and 8 (22 percent) by defecting third parties. Taking intensity into account,
cooperating second parties accounted for 84 percent and cooperating third parties for 70
percent of total investment into punishment while defecting second parties accounted for
16 percent, defecting third parties for 30 percent. Among the class of punishers, therefore,
cooperators clearly supplied most of the punishment.
With respect to targeting, previous experiments have generated clear evidence that when
information about coplayer behavior at the cooperation stage is perfect, then punishment is,
on average, targeted on cheaters. For example, Fehr and Gächter (2000) find evidence of a
clear relationship between deviation from average contribution in a public goods game. Fehr
and Fischbacher (2004) also find that behavior at the cooperation stage is a highly significant
predictor of receiving punishment. But previous experiments have also uncovered consid-
erable heterogeneity among subjects with respect to sanctioning behavior.10 For example,
alongside the targeted punishment of defectors by cooperators, punishment of cooperators is
a less frequent but also robust empirical regularity (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Gächter et al.,
2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Ertan et al., 2009; Gächter and Herrmann, 2010). In Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004), 8.3 percent of cooperators were targeted at the punishment stage of the
second-party punishment game, and 15 percent (independently from the behavior of the tar-
get player’s coplayer) in the third-party punishment game. Our experiment replicates these
findings closely.
Result 3. When information costs are zero, second and third party punishment is generally
targeted on cheating, but third party punishment is less targeted and weaker than second
party punishment. On average, cheating is unprofitable in both the SPMG and the TPMG.
Note that observability (monitoring) is a precondition for targeting. The result therefore
means that the information about the target player’s first stage behavior is, if it is costless
to acquire, used to apply punishment discriminately. In fact, in M0 every second party and
15 out of 16 third parties that imposed a punishment used the information about the target
player’s first stage behavior. In terms of our behavioral types, there are 73 percent T -types,
27 percent N-types, and no B-types among the second parties, and 68 percent T -types, 27
9Recall that the strategy method allows each subject to specify a punishment up to two times in the SPMG and
up to four times in the TPMG, once for each possible first stage action profile given the subject’s own action.
10In an experiment designed to differentiate between a variety of different motivations to impose costly sanctions,
Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2009, 2011) find substantial heterogeneity, with a combination of inequity aversion,
self-interest, spite and direct reciprocal motivations accounting for observed patterns best.
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percent N-types, and 5 percent B-types among the third parties.11 Thus, second and third
party behavior exhibits almost identical distributions of our behavioral types when monitoring
is costless.
However, while we will see below that monitoring costs create significant differences in
those distributions, this type of analysis hides some important differences between second
and third party behavior present in M0 already. First, it is illuminating to compare second
and third party behavior at the individual level. There, 17 out in 22 (77 percent) revealed the
same behavioral type as both a second and a third party. The majority of those (13 subjects,
or 76 percent) are universal T -types, that is, T -types as both a second party and as a third
party. The rest (4 subjects, or 24 percent) are universal N-types. There exist no universal
B-types when monitoring is costless. Of the remaining five subjects that revealed a different
behavioral type as a second and a third party, respectively, two where type T as a second party
and type N as a third party, two the reverse, and one subject was type T as a second party and
type B as a third party.
A second important difference is the stiffness of punishment and the degree of targeting.
In 16 out of 19 second party punishment decisions (84 percent) and in 26 out of 36 third party
punishment decisions (72 percent) the target of a punishment action was a defector (in the
latter case, 16 actions against unilateral defectors and 10 actions against mutual defectors).
Cooperators were the target of 14 percent of second party punishment actions and of 28 per-
cent of third party punishment actions. Taking intensity into account, in the SPMG defectors
received 93 percent of all the punishment imposed while cooperators received 7 percent. In
the TPMG defectors received 77 percent of all the punishment imposed, 60 percent unilateral
defectors and 17 percent mutual defectors, while cooperators received 23 percent. In terms
of average punishments received, cheaters received damages of 22.8 tokens on average in
the SPMG and 18.0 tokens in the TPMG, while cooperators received on average 1.8 tokens
in the SPMG and 4.8 tokens in the TPMG.12. Thus, third party punishment is somewhat
weaker and less targeted, although the average net punishment of cheating exceeded the gain
(10 tokens) by a sufficient margin in both the SPMG (22.8−1.8 = 21 tokens) and the TPMG
(18.0−4.8 = 13.2 tokens).13
3.2 Monitoring and punishment with positive information costs
Results 1 through 3 underline the benchmark quality of the baseline treatment by providing
additional evidence to support similar findings in the literature. Against this benchmark, we
now report results on the behavioral implication of making monitoring, the acquisition on the
target player’s first stage action, costly. We establish three effects of positive monitoring costs
relative to the zero-cost baseline and show that each one affects third parties differently than
second parties: A «direct punishment cost effect» that is stronger in second parties (result 4),
as well as a «blind punishment effect» (result 5) and a «diffusion effect» (result 6) which are
11Third parties also make a difference on whether defection of the target player is mutual or unilateral, that is, they
also monitored the target player’s coplayer. Among the 15 T -types, 13 (or 87 percent) also conditioned punishment
on the first stage behavior of the target player’s coplayer.
12Defectors whose coplayer also defected received average punishments of 6.9 tokens in the TPMG.
13At the individual level, of the 18 subjects that imposed punishments on cheaters, eight (44 percent) invested
strictly more in punishment in the role of a second party than in the role of a third party, with an average expenditure
difference of 6.6 tokens. Six (33 percent) made no difference. Thus, a majority of 14 subjects (78 percent) indeed
punished at least as strong as a second party than as a third party. The remaining four subjects (22 percent), however,
punished strictly stiffer in the role of a third party than in the role of a second party, with an average expenditure
difference of 4.5 tokens. Although this individual level comparison reveals some additional heterogeneity, the con-
clusion that most people are willing to spend more on punishment when it is themselves who is cheated compared
to when it is someone else is reinforced.
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stronger in third parties, respectively. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly
weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs
rise (result 7).
When monitoring is costly, the relative shares of behavioral types diverge from the base-
line in two important ways. First, a higher overall cost of sanctioning is associated with a
higher share of second and third parties that neither monitor nor punish, which is in line with
previous evidence showing that increasing cost of punishment reduce the supply of sanctions
(Suleiman, 1996; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007a;
Egas and Riedl, 2008).
Result 4. In the presence of positive information costs, the propensity to punish decreases
relative to the baseline stronger in second than in third parties.
We term this the «punishment cost effect». Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this first finding:
Among second parties, the share of subjects that neither monitor nor punish (type N) increases
from 27 percent in M0 to 67 percent in M5 and 74 percent in M10. The hypothesis that the
frequency of N-types and monitoring costs are independent can be clearly rejected (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p < .001). Pairwise, only the former change is statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney test, p = .001), the latter is not (p = .414).
Likewise, among third parties the share of type-N subjects increases from 27 percent
in M0 to 62 percent in M5 and 57 percent in M10. The hypothesis that the frequency of
N-types and monitoring costs are independent can again be clearly rejected (Kruskal-Wallis
test, p = .017), whereas pairwise, only the change associated with increasing the fee from
zero to five is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test, p = .005), the change associated
with increasing the fee from five to ten is not (p = .554). Comparing second and third parties,
it is evident that the share of N-types is slightly less increasing in third than in second parties,
both absolutely (30 vs. 47 percentage points) and relatively (111 vs. 174 percent). The fre-
quency of N-types is apparently not different between second and third parties in the baseline
condition, but significantly different when monitoring is costly (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p = .016; p = .366 in M5 and p = .011 in M10). As an alternative demonstration, a dummy
indicating treatment (both costly monitoring conditions) is significantly positively correlated
with a dummy indicating type N (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.282, p = .000, or Kendall’s τb = 0.282,
p = .000), whereas this correlation is somewhat stronger for second parties (Phi/Cohen’s
w = 0.325, p = .000, or Kendall’s τb = 0.325, p = .000) than for third parties (Phi/Cohen’s
w = 0.242, p = .005, or Kendall’s τb = 0.242, p = .005).
Second, in addition to the result on the propensity to punish at all, our design explicitly
allows to study punitive behavior of those individuals that opt to remain ignorant about their
target player’s first stage behavior.
Result 5. In the presence of positive information costs, the propensity to punish indiscrimi-
nately increases relative to the baseline stronger in third than in second parties.
We term this the «blind punishment effect». Figures 1 and 2 report the share of blind
punishers (type B) that do not acquire information and yet impose sanctions. Among second
parties, this share increases from zero in the baseline to 12 and 13 percent as the monitoring
costs increase to 5 and 10 tokens, respectively. The former change is statistically marginally
significant (Mann-Whitney test, p= .089), the latter not (p= .885). However, both frequencies
under positive monitoring costs are statistically significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests, p = .005 and p = .014, respectively). The frequency of indiscriminate pun-
ishers as a fraction of all punishers increases successively from zero in M0 to 36 percent in
M5 and to 50 percent in M10.
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Among third parties, the share of blind punishers increases from 5 percent (one out of
22) in the baseline to 21 and 26 percent as the monitoring costs increase to 5 and 10 tokens,
respectively. Here, the change associated with increasing the fee from zero to five is sta-
tistically marginally significant (Mann-Whitney test, p = .073), the change associated with
increasing the fee from zero to ten is statistically significant (p = .036), while the change as-
sociated with increasing the fee from five to ten is not significant (p = .550). However, both
frequencies under positive monitoring costs are again statistically significantly different from
zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p < .001, respectively). The frequency of indiscriminate
punishers as a fraction of all punishers increases successively from 6 percent in M0 to 56
percent in M5 and to 60 percent in M10. Again comparing second and third parties, it is evi-
dent that third parties have clearly a stronger tendency to punish indiscriminately than second
parties when monitoring is costly (absolute increase of B-types 21 vs. 13 percentage points).
The frequency of B-types is not significantly different between second and third parties in
the baseline condition (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = .317), but significantly different when
monitoring is costly (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = .014; p = .083 in M5 and M10). Again,
as an alternative demonstration, a dummy indicating treatment (both costly monitoring con-
ditions) is significantly positively correlated with a dummy indicating type B (Phi/Cohen’s
w = 0.160, p = .009, or Kendall’s τb = 0.160, p = .009), whereas this correlation is somewhat
weaker for second parties (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.151, p = .080, or Kendall’s τb = 0.325, p = .082)
than for third parties (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.172, p = .050, or Kendall’s τb = 0.172, p = .043).
A corollary of the previous two results is that the share of targeted second party punishers
(type T ) decreases from 73 percent for costless monitoring to 21 percent in M5 and 13 percent
in M10, while the third party T -types decreases from 68 percent in M0 to 17 percent in
M5 and M10, respectively. Again, in both cases the hypothesis that the frequency of T -
types and monitoring costs are independent can be clearly rejected (Kruskal-Wallis tests,
p < .001). Pairwise the changes associated with increasing the fee from zero to five and zero
to ten, respectively, are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney tests, p < .001 and p < .001,
respectively, in second parties; p = .000 and p = .036, respectively, in third parties), while the
change associated with increasing the fee from five to ten is not (p = .269 in second parties,
p = .920 in third parties). A dummy indicating treatment (both costly monitoring conditions)
is significantly negatively correlated with a dummy indicating type T (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.447,
p = .000, or Kendall’s τb = −0.447, p = .000), whereas this correlation is a little stronger for
second parties (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.459, p = .000, or Kendall’s τb = −0.459, p = .000) than for
third parties (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.436, p = .000, or Kendall’s τb = −0.436, p = .000).
We now proceed to the second step of the analysis by investigating the implications for
intensity and direction of second and third party punishment, respectively. Recall (result 3)
that in the baseline condition both second and third party punishment was clearly targeted on
cheating, but that the latter was somewhat weaker and less targeted than the former. It turns
out that the first aspect is weakened and that the second is strengthened when monitoring is
costly.
Result 6. At positive information costs, cooperators remain the dominant origin of the direc-
tion of second and third party punishment relative to the baseline, but cheaters dominate less
as its target.
We term the latter the «diffusion effect». Concerning the origin of punishment action,
the fraction of P-types among second parties was between 29 (M10) and 31 percent (M5)
among the cooperators and between 18 (M10) and 39 percent (M5) among the defectors.14
Stated differently, the group of second party punishers (P-types) consisted out of 68 percent
14Among second parties, 31 percent (15 out of 48) and 29 percent (10 out of 35) of cooperators imposed sanctions
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cooperators and 32 percent defectors in M5, and out of 83 percent cooperators and 17 percent
defectors in M10. Likewise, among third parties the fraction of P-types was between 35 (M5)
and 44 percent (M10) among the cooperators and 43 percent (in both M5 and M10) among
the defectors.15 In other words, the group of third party punishers (P-types) consisted out of
60 percent cooperators and 40 percent defectors in M5, and out of 70 percent cooperators and
30 percent defectors in M10. Thus, cooperators remain the dominant origin of punishment
action, and there are evidently no noteworthy differences between second and third parties
along those lines.
As already suggested by results 4 and especially 5, this is different with respect to the
target locus of sanctions. A qualitative feature that is common among second and third parties
is that, despite the rise in monitoring costs, defectors rather than cooperators remain the
prevailing target of sanctions on average, although less pronounced. In the SPMG (see also
table 1), defection is still punished significantly more often than cooperation in both M5
(32 vs. 17 percent, p = .004, Wilcoxon signed-rank test), and M10 (26 vs. 13 percent, p =
.014, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Also, defectors continue to receive stronger second party
punishment on average than cooperators in both M5 (9.8 vs. 3.3 tokens, p = .006, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test), and M10 (5.6 vs. 1.1 tokens, p = .014, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Table 1: Frequency of punishment and mean damages (punishments received, or punishment expendi-
tures times three) in the SPMG.
Relative frequency Mean damages
κm Cooperation Defection Cooperation Defection Net Damages
0 .136 .727 1.8 22.8 21.0
5 .167 .318 3.3 9.8 6.5
10 .130 .261 1.1 5.6 4.6
In the TPMG (see also tables 2 and 3), in M5 unilateral defection is still punished signif-
icantly more often than mutual defection (36 vs. 26 percent, p = .020, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test) or cooperation (24 percent, p = .011). The same is true for M10, where cheating is pun-
ished 41 percent of the time, and mutual defection (30 percent) or cooperation (33 percent)
less often, although the differences are not statistically significant in this condition (p = .059
on defectors in M5 and M10, respectively, with respective average expenditures of 11.6 tokens and 8.2 tokens.
Five and four of the cooperators in M5 and M10, respectively, also imposed punishments on other cooperators,
with respective average expenditures of 6.8 tokens and 3 tokens. 11 out of 18 (61 percent) and 9 out of 11 (82
percent) of the defectors did not punish in M5 and M10, respectively. Of the remaining seven defectors in M5, four
punished indiscriminately (B-type) with an average expenditure of 5.8 tokens, and three targeted (T -type) with an
average expenditure of 6 tokens on defectors and 5 tokens on cooperators, plus the five tokens monitoring fee. Of the
remaining two defectors in M10, both punished indiscriminately (B-type) with an average expenditure of 2 tokens.
15Among third parties, 35 percent (15 out of 43) and 44 percent (14 out of 32) of cooperating third parties imposed
sanctions on defectors in M5 and M10, respectively, with respective average expenditures for punishing unilateral
(mutual) defectors of 2.9 tokens (1.3 tokens) and 3.2 tokens (2.0 tokens). Eight (19 percent) and ten (31 percent)
of the cooperators in M5 and M10, respectively, also imposed punishments on other cooperators, with respective
average expenditures for punishing unilateral (mutual) cooperators of 0.7 tokens (1.2 tokens) and 0.6 tokens (1.6
tokens). 13 out of 23 (57 percent) and 8 out of 14 (57 percent) of the defecting third parties did not punish in M5
and M10, respectively. Of the remaining ten defectors in M5, seven punished indiscriminately (B-type) with an
average expenditure of 4.6 tokens in case the target player’s coplayer defected, and 4.3 tokens in case the target
player’s coplayer cooperated. Three punished discriminately (T -type) with an average expenditure of 6.7 tokens on
unilateral defectors, 5 tokens on mutual defectors, and 1.7 tokens on cooperators, plus the five tokens monitoring
fee. Likewise, of the remaining six defectors in M10, four punished indiscriminately (B-type) with an average
expenditure of 4.3 tokens in case the target player’s coplayer cooperated, and 1.8 tokens in case the target player’s
coplayer defected. Two targeted (T -type) with an average expenditure of 6 tokens on unilateral defectors, 2.5 tokens
on mutual defectors, and between 0.5 and 1 tokens on cooperators, plus the ten tokens monitoring fee.
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and p = .103, respectively). Also, unilateral defectors continue to receive stronger punish-
ment on average than mutual defectors or cooperators in both M5 (2.6 vs. 1.6 vs. 1.4 tokens,
p = .038 for the first and p = .018 for the second difference), and M10 (2.8 vs. 1.7 vs. 1.5
tokens, p < .001 for the first and p = .055 for the second difference).
Table 2: Frequency of punishment in the TPMG.
Cooperation Defection
κm Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual
0 .227 .227 .727 .455
5 .200 .227 .364 .258
10 .174 .326 .413 .304
Table 3: Mean damages (punishments received, or punishment expenditures times three) in the TPMG.
Cooperation Defection
κm Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual
0 3.4 4.1 18.0 6.8
5 3.0 4.0 7.9 4.8
10 1.7 4.6 8.5 5.0
Importantly, both in the SPMG and the TPMG cheating was no longer unprofitable as
there was a strictly positive monitoring fee.
Result 7. In both the SPMG and the TPMG, cheating is only unprofitable when monitor-
ing is costless. The incentives to cooperate are weaker in the TPMG than in the SPMG at
zero information costs already, and the presence of positive information costs increases this
difference.
For the SPMG this result is summarized in table 1. We first observe that there is no sig-
nificant variation in punishment of cooperation (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .756). Punishment
of defection, however, is significantly different between treatments (p < .001), exhibiting a
diminishing trend as monitoring costs rise (Kendall’s τb = −.266, p < .001). The same is true
for the mean net punishment of defection, which is the difference between damages imposed
on defection and cooperation, respectively (Kendall’s τb = −.299, p < .001). Hence, on aver-
age defecting gets less costly as monitoring costs rise. As a result, defection did pay when
monitoring costs were positive.
The analogous result for the TPMG is summarized in table 3. Again, there is no signifi-
cant variation in punishment of cooperation (Kruskal-Wallis tests, p = .796 for unilateral and
p = .600 for mutual cooperation) and mutual defection (p = .291), but punishment of cheating
is significantly different between treatments (p = .005), its intensity being markedly lower
when monitoring is costly compared to the baseline condition. In consequence cheating also
did pay when monitoring costs were positive.
The difference between average punishment of cheaters and average punishment of coop-
erators, however, decreases less strongly in second parties (from 20.1 tokens in M0 over 6.5
tokens in M5, a 68 percent decrease, to 4.5 tokens in M10, a further 31 percent decrease, for
a total decrease of 78 percent) than in third parties (from 14.3 tokens in M0 over 1.2 tokens
in M5, a 92 percent decrease, to 1.3 tokens in M10, for a total decrease of 91 percent) in
relative terms. This reinforces the conclusion that while both second and third party punish-
ment tends to become less targeted on cheaters through the introduction of monitoring costs,
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the effect is stronger in third parties. In other words, while third party punishment provides
weaker incentives to cooperate at costless monitoring already, the introduction of monitoring
costs renders the difference even larger.
It should be noted, however, that subjects did not anticipate the effects of monitoring
costs on punishment and the incentives to cooperate entirely.16 In the baseline condition
of the present experiment, subjects’ average expectations match actual punishment patterns
remarkably accurately.17 In the presence of positive monitoring costs, on the other hand,
the punishment anticipation hypothesis fails. As shown in tables 5 and 6 in the appendix,
subjects anticipate the actual impact of monitoring costs on punishment patterns qualitatively
(the direction), but quantitatively they significantly underestimate the effects of increasing
monitoring costs on their coplayers’ monitoring and punishment behavior. The difference is
that in the subjects’ expectations, positive monitoring costs have a much weaker impact on
the punishment of defectors (and hence the net punishment of defecting) than is actually the
case. For example, the actual net cost of defecting in the SPMG amounted to 6.5 tokens
on average in M5 and 4.6 on average in M10, whereas the expected net costs were 12.3
and 10.0, respectively, on average. As a result, cheating was still unprofitable in subjects’
expectation.18
To sum up, monitoring costs lead to three important qualitative differences compared to
the costless monitoring condition which are common in second and third parties: (1) The
supply of social sanctions decreases as if punishment costs increased. (2) A small, but signif-
icant share of subjects sacrifices resources to actively monitor their coplayer and thus target
their punishment. (3) A small, but significant share of subjects chooses to punish without
information on whether the coplayer cooperated. The first-order impact of increasing mon-
itoring costs is therefore to reduce the supply of sanctions.19 But this variation also brings
to light important heterogeneities across subjects with respect to the type of sanctioning they
will supply, targeted or blind. Targeted sanctioning is conducive to maintaining cooperation
because it rewards cooperative behavior in relative terms. The deliberately blind sanctioning
observed in the experiment on the other hand is unproductive for maintaining cooperation.
Here is where we find the key difference between second and third party behavior: While
second parties respond to the introduction of monitoring costs more often than third parties
with refraining from sanctioning altogether contingent on remaining «blind», third parties
opt more often than second parties to indiscriminate punishment in this case. We turn to this
16Fehr and Gächter (2002, p. 139, emphasis added) noted that defection «may cause strong negative emotions
among the cooperators [which] may trigger their willingness to punish ... and that most people expect these emo-
tions.» The anticipation of non-strategic punishment is the key link to the cooperation decision in the first stage.
17In the SPMG, subjects expected on average to receive punishment of 21.2 (1.0) tokens in case of defection
(cooperation). This is a remarkably accurate prediction of the actual punishments of 22.8 (1.8) tokens. The rank
correlation between expectations and realizations is significantly positive (Kendall’s τb = .547, p = .001, in case
of defection, τb = .622, p = .004, in case of cooperation). In the TPMG subjects expected on average to receive
punishment of 17.9 tokens in case of unilateral defection, 8.7 in case of mutual defection, and at most 4.2 in case of
cooperation. Those predictions match the the actual punishments of 18.0 tokens in case of unilateral defection, 6.8
in case of mutual defection, and at most 4.1 in case of cooperation closely as well. The rank correlation between
expectations and realizations is significantly positive (Kendall’s τb = .440 in case of unilateral defection, τb = .552
in case of mutual defection, τb = .426 in case of unilateral cooperation, τb = .453 in case of mutual cooperation, all
p = .000). López-Pérez and Kiss (2012), whose study explicitly focuses on whether subjects anticipate positive and
negative sanctions, obtain similar results as ours. Notably, they find that punishments are better anticipated than
rewards.
18This might explain the fact that we did find no significant differences in the frequency of cooperation across
conditions.
19This qualifies results reported in a related paper by Grechenig et al. (2010) in the sense that if it is the subject’s
own choice of whether to acquire information on their coplayer’s behavior, the vast majority refrain from punishment
altogether if they opted to remain ignorant.
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difference in more detail in the following section.
3.3 Why is there more «blind punishment» among third parties?
The aggregate differences between the SPMG and the TPMG are driven by individuals that
behave differently when they find themselves in the role of a second or third party, respec-
tively. Across all treatments, 37 out of 134 subjects change their behavioral type between
the roles. This fraction is disproportionally large in the costly monitoring treatments, where
32 out of 112 subjects (29 percent) reveal a different behavioral type as a second and a third
party, respectively, the rest exhibit the same type. Those subjects are represented by the off-
main-diagonal cells in table 4, where each cell illustrates a different transition path. The key
insight from this data is that there are disproportionally more subjects (18) that punish blindly
as a third but not as a second party than the other way around (six subjects).
Table 4: «Transition matrix» of behavioral types across the SPMG and the TPMG for the costly moni-
toring treatments.
TPMG Type
SPMG Type N T B Margin
N (62) .554 (6) .054 (10) .089 (78) .696
T (2) .018 (10) .089 (8) .071 (20) .179
B (3) .027 (3) .027 (8) .071 (14) .125
Margin (67) .598 (19) .170 (26) .232 (112) 1.000
Relative frequencies. Absolute frequencies in parantheses.
There are at least two possible and not mutually exclusive explanations why subjects be-
have differently in the two roles.20 First, an obvious and conventional explanation would be
that the subjects’ prior about the target player’s first stage behavior differs between the SPMG
and the TPMG. A second explanation for the differences in behavior is that the SPMG and
the TPMG bring out differences in the social or moral preferences attached to the role of
being a second party or third party. This would point to the presence of a «pure role effect»
that makes the same individual punish for different reasons depending on their position in
a social dilemma. The experimental design elicited subjects’ beliefs and risk preferences.
The first candidate explanation can therefore be addressed directly and the second hypothesis
indirectly, provided that our elicitation procedure measures the subject’s beliefs and risk pref-
erences adequately. As a first step, we therefore conduct a plausibility test on our measures
of beliefs and risk preferences. Having passed this test, we examine in a second step the
evidence for the two candidate explanations.
First stage behavior is consistent with «conditional cooperation»
To establish plausibility that our measures of beliefs and risk preferences are valid, we in-
vestigate their correlations with first-stage cooperation behavior and evaluate the consistency
with known motivational traits. The results suggest that the elicitation produced valid mea-
sures of subjects’ beliefs and risk preferences. To see this, recall the current agreement in the
literature that a majority of people have «conditionally cooperative» or «strongly reciprocal»
preferences (see e.g. Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis et al., 2005; Gächter, 2007, for overviews).
20One might add that the shape of the risk preferences differs between the two games, but this appears not very
plausible.
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For a player with such preferences, defect is not a dominant strategy in a cooperation game
of the type implemented in our experiment. Instead, the player prefers to cooperate if (and
only if) the coplayer cooperates as well. This implies that a simultaneous-move cooperation
game involves a decision under strategic risk, such that the probability of a cooperative move
should be (i) increasing in a player’s belief in the coplayer’s cooperation, and (ii) decreasing
in a player’s degree of risk aversion.21 Previous experiments have confirmed these predic-
tions (e.g. Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Houser et al., 2010; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010),
and our results are affirmative as well: A dummy indicating an optimistic belief about the
coplayer’s cooperation (70 or more percent sure that the coplayer cooperates) is significantly
positively correlated (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.459, p = .000, or Kendall’s τb = 0.459, p = .000),
and a dummy indicating a pessimistic belief (70 or more percent sure that the coplayer de-
fects) is significantly negatively correlated with own cooperation (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.515,
p = .000, or Kendall’s τb = −0.515, p = .000). Furthermore, a dummy indicating risk aver-
sion is negatively correlated with own cooperation, although not statistically significantly so
(Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.130, p = .133, Kendall’s τb = −0.130, p = .135). However, if we restrict
the analysis to those whose belief is indeterminate (reference category to optimistic and pes-
simistic belief, respectively) we get statistical significance and a stronger effect (Phi/Cohen’s
w = 0.276, p = .041, Kendall’s τb = −0.276, p = .044), while for those with a either opti-
mistic or pessimistic beliefs correlation is not significantly different from zero (Phi/Cohen’s
w = 0.008, p = .947, Kendall’s τb = −0.008, p = .953). These results are retained in multi-
ple regression analysis with all indicators included simultaneously.22 This consistency with
known motivational patterns is indirect evidence in favor of the validity of our measures of
beliefs and risk preferences.
Is it because of different beliefs?
With plausible measures of beliefs and risk preferences in hand, we now proceed to using
elicited beliefs about target player behavior to address the first hypothesis directly. Overall,
the subjects’ beliefs about the target player’s behavior did not differ significantly between
the SPMG and the TPMG (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = .340): The average second party
expected the target player to cooperate with probability .667, the average third party with
probability .643.23 For investigating the differential effects of monitoring costs on second
and third party information acquisition and punishment, however, the relevant population is
not the whole sample but only those 37 subjects that changed their behavioral type. Those
subjects’ beliefs about the target player’s behavior did not differ significantly between the
SPMG and the TPMG either (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = .766): The average second
party expected the target player to cooperate with probability .703, the average third party
with probability .676.24
The invariance of beliefs with respect to the setting (SPMG or TPMG) can also be shown
by calculating the correlation between the belief indicators used above and the behavioral type
indicators. The dummy indicating an optimistic belief about the target player’s cooperation
is not correlated with either one of the type indicators.25 The same is true for the dummy
21For a player with «standard» payoff-monotone preferences defect is a dominant strategy, such that beliefs and
risk preferences are irrelevant.
22We estimated various specifications using a number of different fitting methods, obtaining essentially the same
results. They are available from the authors on request.
23Separated by treatment, only when monitoring is costless there is a significant difference (p = .046), the average
second party expecting the target player to cooperate with probability .618, the average third party with probability
.718.
24Separated by treatment, there are also no significant differences.
25The Phi coefficient or Cohen’s w is 0.059 for the type N indicator, 0.028 for the type B indicator, and 0.089 for
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indicating a pessimistic belief about the target player’s cooperation.26 In sum, differences
in beliefs do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the differential effects of monitoring
costs on second and third party information acquisition and punishment in this experiment.
Is it because of different preferences?
The second candidate explanation focuses on the possibility of a «pure role effect», possibly
tied to different social or moral preferences activated by occupying the position of a second
or third party. To examine this possibility, we exploit the idea that preferences that underpin
conditionally punitive behavior are conceivably related to the sensitivity towards committing
punishment errors: Punishing someone who cooperated would be perceived differently from
leaving a cheater escape unpunished. If those preferences differ between the SPMG and
the TPMG, then this sensitivity should differ between the games as well, as long as risk
preferences do not differ too much between the SPMG and TPMG. In other words, given a
player’s beliefs and risk preferences (and punishment costs), behavior can only differ in the
two roles if the subjective benefits accruing through punishment differ.
The elicited risk preferences provide an opportunity to examine the possible presence of
a «pure role effect» to some degree. In a population of subjects whose preferences embody
a norm of conditional cooperation, these players should have a preference towards targeting
punishments on cheaters. Behaving as a N-type or a B-type then both implies a risk of error:
The N-type risks letting a defector escape unpunished, the B-type risks erroneously harming
a cooperator. The only risk-free option is behaving as a T -type. It follows that risk averse
subjects should have a stronger tendency to sort into T -type, while more risk tolerant subjects
should be more willing to sort into N- or B-type at the margin. With one puzzling exception,
the data is consistent with this reasoning: Restricting the analysis to the treatment condi-
tions,27 the dummy indicating risk aversion is negatively correlated with a dummy indicating
type N (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.244, p = .000, or Kendall’s τb = −0.244, p = .000), and positively
correlated with dummies indicating type B (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.181, p = .007, or Kendall’s
τb = 0.181, p = .007) and type T (Phi/Cohen’s w = 0.124, p = .064, or Kendall’s τb = 0.124,
p = .065), respectively. Thus, the predictions with respect to N-types and T -types are con-
firmed. The coefficient for B-types, however, goes exactly in the opposite direction. B-types
are more risk averse than the average rather than less. A possible explanation is that for these
subjects, the error of letting a defector escape unpunished is evaluated as much worse than the
error of erroneously harming a cooperator. A test of this hypothesis is an interesting avenue
for future research.
The presence of a pure role effect requires that the correlation between risk preferences
and observed behavior differ between second and third parties. A difference would be indirect
evidence that the average subject is motivated differently in the role of second and a third
party, respectively. Comparing the correlations between the risk aversion indicator and the
type indicators, every single one is stronger for second than for third parties: For the dummy
indicating type N, the Phi coefficient or Cohen’s w is 0.267 (p = .005) in second parties
the type T indicator (Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients are identical, except for the negative sign in the first two
cases), but all fail the test for being statistically significantly different from zero (p > .144). This remains to be true
when the analysis is carried out for the baseline and treatment conditions separately, respectively.
26The Phi coefficient or Cohen’s w is 0.039 for the type N indicator, 0.062 for the type B indicator, and 0.094
for the type T indicator (again, Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient is identical, except for the negative sign in the
latter case), but again all fail the test for being statistically significantly different from zero (p > .126). This remains
to be true when the analysis is carried out for the baseline and treatment conditions separately, respectively.
27We do so since the risk free alternative (type T ) is available at no cost in the baseline condition and hence there
is not much systematic variance in type assortment.
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and in 0.224 (p = .018) third parties. Likewise, for the type-B indicator correlation is 0.267
(p = .005) in second parties and 0.224 (p = .018) in third parties. Finally, for the type T
indicator it is 0.156 (p = .099) in second parties and 0.092 (p = .333) in third parties. This
means that second parties appear to be somewhat more sensitive to the risk of punishment
error.
4 Conclusion
Social sanctions have been credited with providing an important instrument for resolving
social dilemmas. These sanctions are provided by materially affected (second) parties and
materially unaffected (third) parties. The supply of such sanctions for non-strategic reasons
and at a cost have attracted the attention of many researchers. This paper reports on an exper-
iment that examines how second and third parties in a social dilemma situation respond to the
presence of monitoring costs that need to be incurred if the sanctioning party wants to be able
to differentiate between cooperators and defectors in the social dilemma. The presence of
such costs is both an empirically salient feature of many social dilemmas and an opportunity
to examine the phenomenon of endogenous information structures in games of cooperation
and punishment. The choice of whether to incur the monitoring cost is, at the same time,
an opportunity to exploit revelation of preferences through choice and learn something about
the preferences underpinning second and third party punishment. The commonalities and
differences of these preferences depending on the role in which the player finds himself are a
key interest of this paper.
Building on a well-established paradigm, the experimental variation of monitoring costs
provides both a close replication of previous evidence on the presence of non-strategic sanc-
tioning and the observation of new types of differences between second party and third party
behavior. Relative to a baseline with zero monitoring costs, three effects are present. First,
a «direct punishment cost effect» of decreasing the gross supply of punishment, which is
the first-order effect. Second, the propensity to punish indiscriminately increases, an impact
we termed «blind punishment effect». Finally, positive information costs lead to defectors
making up a smaller share of the punished and receiving weaker punishment compared to
zero information costs, with the result that incentives get too weak to render cheating unprof-
itable. We called this the «diffusion effect». Comparing second and third party behavior, the
«punishment cost effect» is more pronounced in the former, whereas the «blind punishment
effect» and the «diffusion effect», respectively, is stronger in the latter. As a result, third party
punishment leads to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party
punishment as monitoring costs rise. In addition, the differences between second and third
parties suggest the presence of a «pure role effect»: Taking into account elicited beliefs and
risk preferences, third parties do not simply provide weaker punishment than second parties.
Third parties provide different punishment because they appear to punish for both the same,
but also for different reasons.
Interest within management and policy-making in exploring and implementing informal
team and community governance is increasing. Against the background of this increasing
interest, we believe that evidence on the impact of monitoring cost on punishment behavior
and the results on commonalities and differences between second and third party sanction-
ing behavior are a valuable input to a more fine-grained collection of organization principles.
Several avenues for future research along these lines suggest themselves, for example extend-
ing the setting to interactions with a longer horizon, increasing the group size, and varying
the conditions and nature of information acquisition.
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Table 5: Frequency of subjects expecting to be punished and mean expected damages in the SPMG.
Relative frequency Mean damages
κm Cooperation Defection Cooperation Defection Net Damages
0 .136 .864 1.0 21.1 20.2
5 .212 .636 3.2 15.5 12.3
10 .196 .652 2.4 12.4 10.0
Table 6: Mean damages (punishment points times three) expected by the target players in the TPMG.
Cooperation Defection
κm Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual
0 2.6 4.2 17.9 8.7
5 4.4 2.9 11.2 7.5
10 3.1 2.7 11.4 6.0
Table 7: «Transition matrix» of behavioral types across the SPMG and the TPMG including the base-
line condition.
TPMG Type
SPMG Type N T B Margin
N (66) .493 (8) .060 (10) .075 (84) .627
T (4) .030 (23) .172 (9) .067 (36) .269
B (3) .022 (3) .022 (8) .060 (14) .104
Margin (73) .545 (34) .254 (27) .201 (134) 1.000
Relative frequencies. Absolute frequencies in parantheses.
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